University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

7-23-1993

Nicaragua: Rebel Occupation Of Esteli Casts
Shadow Over Peace & Disarmament Efforts
Erika Harding

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Harding, Erika. "Nicaragua: Rebel Occupation Of Esteli Casts Shadow Over Peace & Disarmament Efforts." (1993).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/11088

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 057475
ISSN: 1060-4189

Nicaragua: Rebel Occupation Of Esteli Casts Shadow Over
Peace &amp; Disarmament Efforts
by Erika Harding
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Nicaragua's efforts to overcome a decade of civil war were dealt another serious blow with the
occupation of the northern city of Esteli by a group of discharged army troops. The Sandinista
Popular Army (Ejercito Popular Sandinista, EPS) counter-offensive to retake the city lasted just over
25 hours, with initial reports tallying 143 casualties in the fighting. The assault, by far the largest
military action since President Violeta Chamorro took office in April 1990, dramatically underscores
the tenuous nature of the peace and reconstruction efforts undertaken during the past three years.
The city of Esteli, with a population of about 140,000, is located on the Pan American Highway about
150 km. north of Managua. The assault began around 2:00 pm on July 21. The rebels, who according
to some reports entered the city in several army trucks commandeered from a local military base,
quickly took over two small police posts, the mayor's office and other government buildings, and
then took up positions in and around the city's main cemetery and cathedral. Several banks located
in the city, as well as commercial establishments, were reportedly broken into and looted. Rebels
also took control of the local hospital, apparently to assure adequate treatment for those wounded
among their ranks. In the initial stage of the operation, the rebels stormed the home of Esteli
police chief Luis Enrique Rodriguez, taking him hostage. Nicaragua's ambassador to Honduras,
Noel Rivas, was also taken hostage by the rebels, along with his spouse, son, and chauffeur. Rivas
was travelling from Tegucigalpa to Managua on the highway near Esteli shortly after the assault
began. Both Rivas and Rodriguez were subsequently released unharmed by the rebels. At no time
did the assailants attack army installations in or around Esteli. The assault was launched by a
group comprised mostly of discharged EPS troops from the Revolutionary Front of Workers and
Farmers (Frente Revolucionario de Obreros y Campesinos, FROC). Reports by the army and by
witnesses quoted in the Nicaraguan media estimated the number of assailants participating in the
attack at between 150 and 300. The FROC is led by veteran Sandinista combatant and former EPS
Major Victor Manuel Gallegos ("Pedrito el Hondureno"). Within hours after the occupation was
launched, a fierce EPS counteroffensive was underway, with waves of EPS reinforcements flown
in from Managua on MiG-17 helicopters. As many as 1,000 EPS troops were eventually deployed
in the operation to retake the city, backed up by a fleet of helicopter gunships. Also dispatched
from Managua were an undisclosed number of BRT tanks, and at least two Katiuskas Soviet-made
multiple rocket launchers capable of firing projectiles out of all 40 of its barrels in less than 20
seconds. Nightfall brought a lull in the fighting, since all electricity, water, and telephone service to
the had been city cut off. The first reports after dawn on July 22 indicated that some of the rebels had
retreated into the hills surrounding the city under cover of darkness, although many later returned.
In the light of day, intense fighting resumed, and EPS units slowly retook control of the city, block
by block. On the evening of July 22, the EPS announced that it had successfully retaken the city. In
all, the EPS reported 143 casualties, including 41 rebels killed and 45 wounded. A total of 59 rebels
either surrendered to authorities or were captured. An undetermined number of FROC combatants,
including Gallegos and his top aides, managed to break the EPS lines which had encircled the
city, escaping into the surrounding hills. The EPS suffered a total of 15 casualties in the fighting to
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retake Esteli (two dead and 13 wounded). In addition, two civilians were killed and 40 wounded
in crossfire between the two sides. The EPS also reported that during the counter-offensive, army
troops confiscated a total of 75 assault rifles, one RPG- 7 rocket launcher, and one M-79 grenade
launcher. In comments to reporters, EPS public relations chief Lt. Col. Ricardo Wheelock confirmed
that EPS units had initiated pursuit operations in outlying areas of Esteli department to capture
rebels in retreat. He said some clashes had taken place between the EPS and FROC units late in
the afternoon of July 22 near La Concordia, about 30 km. northeast of Esteli. Wheelock added that,
upon fleeing the city, Gallegos and his men took with them "a significant amount of cash" stolen
from banks in Esteli, although he could not confirm media reports that the rebels had fled with
some 24 million cordobas (US$4 million). A complete picture of the FROC's specific objectives in the
operation has yet to emerge. Nonetheless, written statements from the group plus comments made
by Gallegos and other combatants to reporters covering the event give some indication as to their
motives. On July 22, a FROC communique was read over several Managua radio stations. In order
to put an end to the fighting, the statement called on the government to grant amnesty to all those
involved in the fighting and to guarantee combatants safe passage out of the city. The communique
went on to list a series of demands to the government, including: * Release from jail of several FROC
members, who the statement described as "political prisoners." * Approval of agricultural loans
to small-scale farmers. * Granting of titles to land and houses that had been turned over by the
previous Sandinista government to small- scale farmers and poor families throughout the country.
* Approval of lifetime pensions as veterans of war for all discharged and retired army personnel.
* Medical treatment, access to free education, and an increase in existing pension payments for
combatants left permanently disabled by the war. Prior to abandoning Esteli, Gallegos briefly spoke
with a small group of reporters. Questioned about the government's amnesty offer, he replied, "no,
we've never considered accepting amnesty...[when the government] turns over land and provides
jobs for the workers, then we'll give some thought to amnesty." Still, Gallegos added that he feels no
resentment towards the army. Another member of the rebel group whose comments were broadcast
over a local radio station said the attack was the result of the desperate situation in which many
Nicaraguans find themselves: "The police have become a repressive organ. People are dying of
hunger and the government is doing nothing." Gallegos is a veteran Sandinista combatant. In
the 1970s, during the FSLN's struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, he was a guerrilla fighter
assigned to the "Northern Front." After the 1979 Sandinista victory, Gallegos joined the EPS,
where he was eventually promoted to the rank of Major. After completing special military training
in Cuba, Gallegos was assigned command of one of the EPS's elite Irregular Warfare Battalions
(Batallones de Lucha Irregular, BLI). With specialized counterinsurgency training, the BLIs were
responsible for carrying out most of the heavy offensive military operations against the contras
during the late 1980s. In November 1990, at the age of 35, Gallegos was retired from the EPS as
part of the downsizing program in which over 60,000 troops were discharged. He took up arms
in February of this year, frustrated over the government's failure to comply with promised social
benefits for retired military personnel. In Managua and Washington, reactions to the attack and
interpretations of its significance varied widely. Nonetheless, there was a generally shared view
that the incident further undermined the tenuous stability of the Chamorro government. State
Department spokesperson Mike McCurry took advantage of the situation to reiterate Washington's
"concern" over the capacity of Nicaraguan civilian authorities to "maintain order" and to exercise
control over the armed forces. Nicaraguan politicians on the far right drew a direct link between
the takeover of Esteli and what they characterized as "threats" made by Daniel Ortega on July 19.
In a speech delivered to an estimated 50,000 supporters in Managua, Ortega warned that if the
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Chamorro administration fails to modify its economic policies, the government "surely won't be
able to finish its term in office," which runs through 1996. In a communique issued on July 21, the
FSLN's National Directorate condemned the attack as "vandalism." The statement urged the rebels
to abandon the city. "All Sandinistas and all Nicaraguans who want peace must reject these actions,
and those of any similar groups, regardless of the political flag with which such actions are covered,"
read the statement. For his part, in a Managua press conference held July 22 prior to conclusion of
the army's counter-offensive, EPS chief Gen. Humberto Ortega expressed concern that the incident
will be used by sectors in Washington seeking to eliminate, reduce, or place conditions on US aid
to Nicaragua. He called on the Chamorro administration to firmly resist such pressures. [In a July
15 voice vote, the Senate adopted a non- binding resolution which calls for the suspension of all US
aid to Nicaragua. The resolution, introduced by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), says that no aid should be
released until completion of a thorough investigation into alleged Sandinista links to "international
terrorism."] Gen. Ortega downplayed the military significance of the attack. He confirmed that
the fighting in Esteli was "intense," but he insisted that rather an "insurrection" or an "offensive,"
the assault "was simply a suicide mission." Reflecting on the causes which gave rise to the action,
Ortega lamented that in Nicaragua, "reason has been blinded by political passions...We should
at least be able to agree amongst ourselves on the basic rules of the game in order to assure a
minimum degree of security." The FROC assault on Esteli, by far the largest military operation
since conclusion of the contra war in 1990, has once again thrust the long-simmering problem
of insecurity in the countryside into the public spotlight. Since 1990, when the last of the 22,000
Nicaraguan Resistance (Resistencia Nicaraguense, RN-contras) rebels were demobilized and
the army underwent its massive downsizing operation, former combatants from both sides have
rearmed and participated in military actions to press for a variety of demands. On several occasions,
the government in Managua has attempted to confront the problem of the rearmed bands through
a combination of dialogue, promises of aid in exchange for demobilization, weapons confiscation
programs, and military sweeps. Although on each occasion the Chamorro administration has been
relatively successful at coaxing many of the fighters to lay down their weapons, its track record is
notoriously bad in following through on promises of land, agricultural tools, and farming inputs
such as seeds and fertilizers. Faced with the growing despair that comes from widespread hunger,
an unemployment rate of over 50%, and the sense of betrayal caused by broken government
promises, many combatants say they have no other alternative than to once again take up arms.
The government's most recent program to curb rural violence was launched on May 18 (see NotiSur
05/21/93). A 30- day state of emergency was imposed throughout the northern zones where most
of the armed activity has been concentrated, and rebels were encouraged to enter one of several
specially- designated security enclaves. Once inside the enclaves, they were to disarm in exchange
for amnesty and new promises of aid for reintegration into civilian life. That plan was set to expire
on Aug. 31, when the EPS would launch an all-out military offensive aimed at eliminating all
rebels who had failed to take advantage of the amnesty offer. But even before the assault on Esteli,
the plan had encountered serious difficulties. According to the army, as of early July, only 200
rebels had actually completed the process of demobilization, while another 500 combatants had
reportedly entered the enclaves with the intent of disarming. Thus, even if the government estimate
of 1,400 rebels is accepted, it means that only half the rebels had entered the enclaves by July.
Meanwhile, the proposed amnesty legislation faces stiff opposition in Managua from the Catholic
church hierarchy and from right wing political sectors. In any case, many observers caution that
the government has consistently underestimated the seriousness of the problem. Many believe
the figure of 1,400 rebels to be a serious underestimation, with independent sources placing the
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total at between 2,500 and 3,000. In addition to the FROC, which has been operating throughout
Esteli department since early this year, the Frente Norte-380, comprised of former contras, is now
well- established in Jinotega, Matagalpa and Nueva Segovia departments. Reports in the US and
Nicaraguan media indicate that the group is receiving financial backing from right-wing Nicaraguan
exiles in the US. Dozens of smaller bands, comprised of between 15 and 20 combatants each, roam
the countryside in the north, carrying out small-scale military operations, and occasionally clashing
with government troops. The eastern departments of Boaco and Chontales have also been the scene
of similar activities. The government and the EPS insist that the rearmed groups are only "bandits
and outlaws," and as such the violence in the countryside should be treated essentially as a police
problem. The occupation of Esteli, however, constitutes the latest indication that the basic causes of
the violence are much more deeply rooted, and that rearmed groups have succeeded in constructing
an important support network among parts of the rural population. (Sources: Reuter, United Press
International, 07/22/92; Notimex, Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias-Spanish news service EFE,
Agence France-Presse, Inter Press Service, 07/21-23/93; New York Times, 07/23/93)
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